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The Future Role of Managed Care and
Capitation in Workers' Compensation
Dean M. Hashimoto"
A patient of mine, Mrs. Lopez, suffered a lower back injury while lifting heavy
equipment. She sustained the injury while working in the housekeeping department at a
local college. I telephoned her supervisor and asked him about Mrs. Lopez's injury. He
assured me that he had forwarded an accident report to the benefits department. He said he
was unaware of any employer policies or training programs governing heavy lifting. The
college did not have an employee health service, but instead relied on a local law firm to
handle the administration of its workers' compensation. When I informed the supervisor
that I thought Mrs. Lopez might be able to return to a restricted duty job soon, he said that
he did not want Mrs. Lopez to return until "she was 100%." I told him that this employee
would benefit medically from returning to a restricted duty job as soon as it was reasonable
rather than waiting until she could perform heavy lifting again. However, the supervisor
replied "Don't you worry about returning her to work so soon. Workers' compensation will
pay for it."
Because of her employer's policies, Mrs. Lopez did not return to work for more than
two-months. She became deconditioned from the lack of normal daily exercise-which
could have been avoided by providing restricted work-and the delay hampered her return
to employment. Mrs. Lopez also became depressed, in part from being isolated from her
workplace, and required antidepressant drug treatment. Although Mrs. Lopez appeared
leery about returning to restricted duty when I initially broached the subject, she expressed
a wish to return to work at later visits, especially when she felt able to perform the bulk of
her regular job. Despite my repeated overtures to her supervisor, the supervisor did not
allow Mrs. Lopez to return to work until she was completely recovered, even when she had
recovered to the point of being able to perform almost all of her usual functions at work.
Her employer paid for all of her medical treatment, including office visits and physical
therapy, and did not have a utilization review agent-as is required by Massachusetts regu-
lations-who should have contacted me to check on the appropriateness and necessity of
treatment. I later learned that the college's legal counsel on workers' compensation issues
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questioned the legal basis for the state's utilization review regulations and advised its cli-
ents that it was not necessary to comply with them.
The approach taken by Mrs. Lopez's employer typifies a more general view. It as-
sumes that the medical care provided injured employees should not differ from that given to
other patients. This view also maintains a separation of medical care from the legal and
administrative aspects of workers' compensation. Mrs. Lopez's employer viewed the medi-
cal care component simply as a health care financing problem and did not link it to other
programs devoted to workplace safety or personnel policies. This separatist approach fails
to establish the kinds of incentives that are essential to reduce the economic and human
costs of workplace accidents.' It prevents applicable medical knowledge from being im-
plemented into practice. In the above example, the employer probably incurred greater
costs than it otherwise would have by not implementing return-to-work and injury-
prevention programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Lopez's story illustrates a significant structural flaw in the workers' compensa-
tion system. Employers tend to view medical care, including injury prevention and rehabili-
tation, solely as the responsibility of the medical sector. At the same time, health care pro-
viders have failed to educate employers about the benefit of return-to-work programs and
injury-prevention approaches. In the foregoing story, returning the employee earlier to re-
stricted work duties would have reduced the total cost of productivity reductions arising
from her employment absence and medical expenses.
Commentators have heavily criticized the workers' compensation system for failure to
provide sufficient incentives to reduce the costs of workplace accidents. 2 Legislatures and
the public view workers' compensation as too expensive and as providing inadequate deter-
rence to workplace injuries.3 Medical expenses account for as much as half of all workers'
compensation costs.4 During the past decade, medical costs associated with workers' com-
pensation increased more than one and one-half times faster than general health expendi-
tures. 5 Because of the high costs of the health care component of workers' compensation,
Legal academics have previously discussed the concept of separatist legal institutions in the context
of'judicial adjudication of disputes involving scientific and technological issues. See, e.g., Stephen L. Car-
ter, Separatism and Skepticism, 92 YALE L.J. 1334, 1334-39 (1983); Joel Yellin, High Technology and the
Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REV. 489, 555-58 (1981); Joel
Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional Designs for Environmental De-
cisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300, 1306-09 (1983). Separatists argue that scientific issues should be sepa-
rated from legal and policy issues and decided by scientific experts. Thus, science courts-composed of
scientific experts-should decide scientific and technological issues, and law courts should be deferential to
the decisions rendered by science courts. See Yellin, supra, 92 YALE L.J. at 1308-09. In this Article, I con-
tend that an analogous phenomenon has in fact occurred in the workers' compensation system. Separatist
businesses have failed to integrate the science of occupational medicine into their administrative practices
and instead have presumed that physicians practicing in the community can take care of the medical aspects
of workers' compensation. However, this separatist approach is flawed because community physicians, by-
and-large, do not have occupational medicine expertise and thus have not initiated important public health
measures, such as return-to-work and accident-prevention programs. Thus, I argue that private regulation in
the form of managed care systems should be created to encourage the application of known scientific prin-
ciples to workplaces by breaking down the administrative barriers created by the current separatist approach.
2 See Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of Occupa-
tional Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REV. 119, 185-87 (1994) [hereinafter Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?].
3 See id. at 122.
4 See Barbara Solomon, Using Managed Care to Control Workers' Compensation Costs, COMPEN-
SATION & BENEFITS REV., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 59, 59.
5 See Rosalind Resnick, Managed Care Comes to Workers' Compensation, Bus. & HEALTH, Sept. 1992,
at 32, at 34.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
commentators have recently made a vigorous call for the implementation of managed care. 6
Unlike other health care financing programs, workers' compensation provides complete
medical care for work-related injuries and diseases without deductibles or copayments.7 In
the past, state regulators used fee schedules as the major device to limit medical costs.8
Historically, these rates were low relative to other health financing systems and thus en-
couraged the participation of a relatively small proportion of health care providers. 9 Be-
cause managed care has lowered payments to providers in regular health care delivery,
however, an increasing number of providers and medical organizations have become inter-
ested in treating workers' compensation patients.1O At the same time, an increasing number
of states are considering ways to implement managed care in workers' compensation."I
Many assume that states may implement managed care in workers' compensation in
the same 'Way states have implemented it in the regular health care delivery system: by em-
phasizing the reduction in the amount of treatment given to injured employees.12 Yet,* man-
aged care is an ambiguous term, and it describes reliance on several different kinds of pri-
vate regulatory systems. The most common form of current managed care in workers'
compensation involves reliance on treatment guidelines and utilization review. 13 State
regulators adopt treatment guidelines and require insurers to use them to determine the ne-
cessity and appropriateness of treatment. 14 This approach requires approval -from utilization
review agents before treatment continues after the initial visit.15 A second major form of
managed care relies on health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider
organizations (PPOs) to provide care based on contractual relationships with employers or
insurers. 16 Because HMOs and PPOs operate on a fixed financial rate based on the Size and
characteristics of the employee group, they have a direct financial incentive to establish
ways to minimize costs. 17 The third form of managed care, capitation, establishes a direct
6 See, e.g., Kathleen Doherty, It's High Noon for Workers' Comp, BUS. & HEALTH, Dec. 1989, at 36,
36; Geoffrey Leavenworth, The Lowdown on Those Plummeting Workers' Comp Costs, Bus. & HEALTH, Apr.
1995, at 37, 37; John Ryan, A Broad Brush Approach to Managed Care, RISK MGMT., June 1992, at 46, 48.
7 See Richard Hauboldt, Managed Care: Workers' Compensation, MED. GROUP MGMT. J., Mar.-Apr.
1994, at 10.
8 See Frank Cerne, Managed Care: Lowering the Boom on Workers' Comp, HOSP. & HEALTH
NETWORKS, Aug. 20, 1994, at 50, 50.
9 In particular, many surgical specialists, such as orthopedic surgeons, maintain a policy of not treating
workers' compensation patients because of substantial differences in compensation compared to mainstream
medical practice.
10 Workers' compensation programs have not yet embraced managed care programs on a large-scale
basis as compared to the mainstream medical care system. See Phillip L. Polakoff & Paul F. O'Rourke,
Managed Care Applications for Workers' Compensation, Bus. & HEALTH, Mar. 1987, at 26, 26.
11 See Resnick, supra note 5, at 32, 35.
12 Currently, worker's compensation systems do not reward physicians for treatments that result in re-
turning employees to their employment promptly. See Cerne, supra note 8, at 52.
13 In Massachusetts, for example, a statute gives responsibility for developing treatment guidelines to
the health care services board, comprised of physicians and community members. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN., ch. 152, § 13(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
14 See, e.g., id. § 13(2).
15 In utilization review, the agent pre-approves a set amount of treatment by the provider and thus as-
sists in the planning and delivery of health care. See Michael R. Costigan & Dwight L. Robertson, Workers'
Compensation: What Works in Managed Care, RISK MGMT., Nov. 1992, at 59, 60, 62. For a more general
description of utilization review techniques, see Joanne Lamprey & Charlotte K. Corcoran, Utilization Re-
view: Changing Perspectives, in MAKING MANAGED HEALTHCARE WORK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS 401, 401-14 (Peter Boland ed., 1993) [hereinafter MAKING MANAGED
HEALTHCARE WORK].
16 For a description of state-sponsored HMO and PPO pilot projects, see David Kohn, State Report:
Florida Mandates Managed Workers' Comp, Bus. & HEALTH, Apr. 1994, at 98, 98-99; Resnick, supra note
5, at 34-35, 38-39; Solomon, supra note 4, at 63-64.
17 See Solomon, supra note 4, at.62.
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financial incentive for treating physicians to minimize the costs of treatment.18 A portion of
the treating physician's income may vary depending on the costs of the treatment or refer-
rals to specialists by the physician group to which he or she belongs. 19 Thus, managed care
may encompass one or all of these major kinds of mechanisms aimed primarily at reducing
treatment costs.
This Article describes how the workers' compensation system created a structural
separation between the legal/administrative system that governs the workplace and the
medical delivery system that treats injured employees. This structure creates incentives that
encourage the legal/administrative system to concentrate primarily on compensating em-
ployees for work-related illnesses, rather than reducing work-related health costs through
mitigation and prevention of work-related injury and disease with the input of medical ex-
pertise. Similarly, the medical care delivery system emphasizes taking care of work-related
illnesses by treating the individual patient, rather than also changing workplace practices.
In Part II, this Article describes the legal and health care components of the workers' com-
pensation legal system. Part III analyzes the workers' compensation system's failure to
encourage the optimal reduction of workplace cost. The rising costs of workers' compen-
sation have not stimulated investments by employers in programs which prevent or mitigate
workplace accident costs.
Part IV hypothesizes that this phenomenon results from the independence of the le-
gal/administrative system from the health care delivery system. Here, I trace the separation
of these systems within workers' compensation to traditional beliefs held by employers,
health care providers, and employees. Part IV also discusses why business managers devel-
oped a general tendency to view workers' compensation as a social welfare program, rather
than as an incentive to reduce the costs of workplace-related illness. Business managers
have tended to rely on regulatory compliance with health and safety standards as the major
means of controlling the incidence of workplace-related illness. Similarly, employees have
tended to view workers' compensation as an entitlement due to them if they suffer from a
work-related illness. Part IV furthermore describes how the medical care delivery system
has traditionally dealt with work-related illness. Health care providers viewed workers'
compensation as a health care financing system, and have generally taken a traditional pa-
tient-centered approach, rather than reforming workplace practices.
In Part IV, I analyze the potential role of managed care and capitation in workers'
compensation. Managed care may not optimally lower the overall costs of workplace acci-
dents if it primarily emphasizes reducing the amount of health care provided to injured em-
ployees. Reduction in the amount of treatment per injured employee may further encourage
provision of health delivery on a high-volume and low-quality basis. Such an approach
would likely result in higher indemnity costs, which cover lost wages if employees cannot
return to work on a timely basis because of inferior medical treatment. Furthermore, if
managed care confines itself to affecting only treatment decisions, then neglect of preven-
tive strategies will continue. Alternatively, however, managed care may represent an oppor-
tunity to restructure the delivery of health care in a manner that improves quality and effi-
cacy of treatment, encourages the prevention of workplace injuries, and provides for a
timely return to work when medically reasonable. This optimal implementation of managed
care and capitation in workers' compensation requires a paradigmatic shift to a community
commitment based on a public health imperative to ensure quality medical care.
18 For examples of state pilot projects involving use of capitation, see Leavenworth, supra note 6, at
38; Vera Tweed, Moving Toward 24-Hour Care, Bus. & HEALTH, Sept. 1994, at 54, 58.
19 For a general discussion describing the capitation method, see Peter R, Kongstvedt, Compensation of
Primary Care Physicians in Open Panels, in THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 55, 55-61 (Peter R.
Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1993).
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
In Part V, I propose that the focus shift to a public health paradigm that emphasizes
prevention and mitigation of injuries and disease in addition to quality of care. Such a
community commitment to public health would be consistent with implementing occupa-
tional medicine principles through managed care. The practice of occupational medicine
may serve to reduce the costs of accidents in workplaces by emphasizing-in addition to
effective and efficient treatment-prevention and mitigation of work-related injuries. In-
deed, the practice of occupational medicine may be particularly compatible with managed
care because physicians in this specialty have developed pragmatic approaches to accom-
modate the tensions created by owing duties to both employee-patients and employers.
This expertise has not yet been implemented on a widespread basis, however. Occupational
medicine principles should provide a basis for a managed care approach that better opti-
mizes a reduction in workplace accident costs. Part VI demonstrates how an emphasis on
this public health imperative advances interests shared by employers, employees, and phy-
sicians.
II. THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL COMPONENTS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Workers' compensation constitutes the first and most enduring tort reform measure in
the United States. States initiated the idea at the turn of this century to provide an exclusive
remedy for work-related injuries and diseases. 20 The remedy consists of indemnity and
medical payments. 2 1 Thus, this innovation created a health care payment system within the
legal structure of workers' compensation.
A. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE
State legislatures established workers' compensation systems holding employers
strictly liable to their employees for injuries and diseases caused by the workplace. 22 To
qualify for benefits, the employee must show three major elements: (1) the existence of an
injury or illness; (2) that the injury or illness arose from and in the course of employment;
(3) and the resulting harm to the employee in lost wages, disfigurement, medical, or reha-
bilitation costs. 23 The amount of recovery depends on the degree of impairment and dis-
ability.24 The determination of impairment is a medical judgment focusing on the func-
tional limitations of the injured employee. 25 In contrast, the determination of disability is a
legal judgment about the effect of the impairment on the ability of the injured employee to
work. 26 Workers' compensation provides lower benefits than those traditionally available
20 See NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING
ENVIRONMENT 453-60 (1991); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 80, at 573
(1984). For a more detailed historical account, see, for example, Timothy A. Watson & Michael J. Valen, A
Historic Review of Workers' Compensation Reform in Florida, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (1993);
Paul R. Gurtler, Comment, The Workers' Compensation Principle: A Historical Abstract of the Nature of
Workers' Compensation, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 285, 285, 293-95 (1989).
21 Leslie 1. Boden, Workers' Compensation, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH: RECOGNIZING AND PRE-
VENTING WORK-RELATED DISEASE 201, 201-02 (Barry S. Levy & David H. Wegman eds., 3d ed. 1995)
[hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH].
22 Subsequently, the federal government established workers' compensation systems for its employees.
See id.
23 Id. Most of the statutes limit the use of workers' compensation law to accidental injuries. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 575.
24 Christopher R. Brigham & Alan L. Engelberg, The Disability/Impairment Evaluation, in A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE 85, 89-91 (Robert J. McCunney
ed., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter A PRACTICAL APPROACH].
25 Id. at 89-90.
26 Id. at 89.
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under tort law. 27 Typically, employees recover only about two-thirds of lost income. 28
Workers' compensation ,does not provide payments for pain and suffering.2 9 Workers'
compensation provides the sole remedy for employees who qualify and, generally, they are
barred from suing their employers in tort law.3 0
Workers' compensation systems rely primarily on an administrative system to resolve
disputes over claims. Prior to administrative adjudication, the system allows insurers in
many states to have independent medical examiners (IMEs) evaluate claimants to determine
whether the insurer should initiate or continue payments.31 The IMEs, who are physicians
paid by insurers, determine such issues as: whether the claimant's injury or illness falls
within the jurisdiction of workers' compensation; whether the claimant is presently im-
paired and disabled; and whether the medical treatment rendered has been necessary and
appropriate. 32 If an insurer decides not to initiate or continue payment to the claimant based
on the IME report, the claimant may still present the claim to an administrative judge for a
legal decision on the above issues.33 While the original purpose motivating the establish-
ment of workers' compensation systems was to provide an administrative claims system
more efficient and speedier than the tort system, litigation before a claim is decided may
cause substantial delays.
Workers' compensation requires the employer to obtain insurance or to self-insure,
thus shifting the costs of workplace injury from the employee to the employer.34 The em-
ployer's insurance premium rates depend on the hazardous risks of the particular workplace
and the employer's experience. 35 From an economic perspective" therefore, workers' com-
pensation should ideally internalize the costs of workplace accidents that injure employees
by passing the costs on to consumers of the employer's products and services. 36 If the costs
of workplace accidents exceed the costs of prevention, then a rational employer would
ideally invest in improving workplace safety. 37
27 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 574 ("[Tlhis remedy is in the nature of a compromise.").
28 Junius C. McElveen, Jr. & Thomas Beck, Legal and Ethical Issues, in A PRACTICAL APPROACH, su-
pra note 24, at 20, 21. Data show that there is approximately a 60% wage replacement for occupational
injury victims and 40% for those who.are severely disabled from occupational disease. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES (1980), reprinted in ASHFORD &
CALDART, supra note 20, at 462 [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR INTERIM REPORT].
29 See Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 209.
30 The basic exceptions to exclusivity include intentional misconduct by employers, see KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 576-77, or when an employer acts in a dual capacity as an employer and a manufacturer-
supplier of a product which harms an employee.
31 See Brigham & Engelberg, supra note 24, at 85.
32 See id. For recent legal cases that define the role of IME physicians in Massachusetts, see Neff v.
Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. Accidents, 653 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 1995) (holding that workers' com-
pensation statute implicitly confers authority to grant waivers to indigent claimants of required IME fee);
Scheffler's Case, 643 N.E.2d 1023 (Mass. 1994) (holding that IME report was prima facie evidence for is-
sues of medical matters and vocational status or ability to perform a specific job); Murphy v. Commissioner
of the Dep't of Indus. Accidents, 635 N.E.2d 1180 (Mass. 1994) (holding unconstitutional provisions regard-
ing payment of fees). For recent criticism of expert testimony, see, Jay Katz, "The Fallacy of the Impartial
Expert" Revisited, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 141 (1992).
33 The administrative judge decides on the merits of the workers' compensation claim. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 45 (West 1988).
34 Gary A. Scarzafava & Frank Herrera, Jr., Workplace Safety-The Prophylactic and Compensatory
Rights of the Employee, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 911, 942 (1982).
35 Id.
36 See Keith N. Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers' Compensation,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 126-29 (1992).
37 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 95-129
(1977). Thus, workers' compensation, like tort law, may encourage specific deterrence of imposing eco-
nomically unreasonable risks on employees. This specific deterrence approach contrasts with the general
deterrence by regulations that discourage the imposition of defined categories of risks. Specific deterrence
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
B. THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY STRUCTURE
Unlike other health care financing programs, workers' compensation provides com-
plete medical care for work-related injuries and diseases without deductibles, copayments,
or other limits. 38 In essence, employees who suffer from work-related injuries or illnesses
have a right to health care as part of their workers' compensation benefits.39 These health
care benefits may include provider fees, physical therapy, medications, medical devices,
rehabilitation services, and vocational training. 40 The workers" compensation system usu-
ally relies on fee schedules to determine the amount of the payment provided for these vari-
ous benefits.4 1
Health care providers serve as the gatekeepers to workers' compensation health care
delivery, and they also provide important information to the attorneys and adjudicators of
legal claims.4 2 Insurers and IMEs rely on information in the medical record which indicates
whether the injury is work-related and thus within the purview of workers' compensation.4 3
Attorneys frequently request that treating providers assess the degree of impairment and
disability in addition to whether the injury is work-related. 4 4 IMEs may serve as a check on
health care providers by determining whether a particular injury is work-related and the
degree of impairment and disability. 45 Insurers may stop or fail to initiate payment for
medical services if an IME decides either that an injury is not work-related or that a em-
ployee is medically ready to return to work.
46
III. THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM'S FAILURE
TO DETER WORKPLACE ACCIDENTS
The workers' compensation system presently fails' to encourage optimal reduction of
workplace accident costs. 4 7 This failure currently manifests itself in the rising workers'
presumes that employers will rationally invest in safety, based on free market pressures, in contrast to gen-
eral deterrence by regulation. See id. at 95.
38 The only law review article which examines in detail the workers' compensation system as a health
care delivery system is Debra T. Ballen, The Sleeper Issue in Health Care Reform: The Threat to Workers'
Compensation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1291 (1994). The article examines the policies underlying the proposed
Clinton health care reform proposal for extending 24-hour coverage to workers' compensation patients.
Twenty-four-hour coverage programs provide health care to both workers' compensation and mainstream
patients within the same system. While this approach removes health care providers' incentive to misclas-
sify patients in order to receive the higher reimbursement, it does not necessarily dissolve the separation in
workers' compensation between health care delivery and administrative systems as described herein, see
infra part IV. Instead, 24-hour coverage programs may perpetuate this separation by allowing health care
providers to treat workers' compensation patients in the same manner as mainstream patients, despite the
advantages of instead promoting high quality care, injury-prevention, and return-to-work programs.
39 See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 6, at 36 (quoting AFL-CIO workers' compensation expert stating that
"workers' comp is not a benefit-it's a statutory right").
40 See, e.g., Boden, supra note 21, at 202.
41 See Cerne, supra note 8, at 52.
42 See James H. Dobyns, Role of the Physician in Workers' Compensation Injuries, 12A J. HAND
SURGERY 826, 826, 828 (1987).
43 The medical record contains the health care provider's description of how the workplace accident oc-
curred, as well as a description of the physical examination of the injured employee.
44 An injured employee may be partially or totally disabled. Furthermore, this disability may be tempo-
rary or permanent.
45 Insurers hire IME physicians to see patients and review their medical records to make these deci-
sions. In Massachusetts, insurers are allowed to discontinue indemnity and medical payments to the em-
ployee "if the IME determines that the employee is capable to return to the job he or she held at the time of
the injury." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 8(l), (2)(d), (4) (West Supp. 1996).
46 See id. § 8(2)(d).
47 See Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 122-23.
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compensation costs and a lack of a corresponding increase in investment in improving
workplace safety. 48 Because the managed care approach dominates mainstream health care
delivery systems, this approach will also likely be implemented in the workers' compensa-
tion system to reduce medical treatment costs.
A. RISING WORKERS' COMPENSATION COSTS
Despite the rising costs of workers' compensation, there has been no corresponding
reduction in workplace injuries and diseases. Between 1985 and 1990, workers' compensa-
tion costs doubled and by 1990 totaled an annual $60 to $70 billion nationwide.49 These
costs already constitute over two percent of payroll. 50 Moreover, workers' compensation
costs are expected to "top the $140 billion mark by the year 2000."'5 1 While the rate of in-
crease in the costs of workers' compensation has been moderate in the last few years, there
is still considerable concern about how to control these costs. 52 Injury rates in the work-
place have not declined at all in this period of rising costs.5 3 Thus, the workers' compensa-
tion system does not appear to provide adequate incentive to reduce the costs of workplace
accidents.5 4
Professor Emily Spieler recently published a seminal article describing this phenome-
non, which she calls a paradox.55 Professor Spieler noted that "[i]t would seem reasonable
to expect that rising compensation costs would stimulate employers to engage in efforts to
prevent occupational injury and disease. There is no persuasive evidence that this is so,
however." 56  She concludes that this failure of employers to invest in prevention is
"remarkable in view of the fact that ... enterprises with aggressive safety programs often
exhibit lower, sometimes substantially lower, workers' compensation costs, and that the
reduction in these costs more than offsets the cost of safety initiatives." 57 Finally, Professor
Spieler points out that arguing over the degree of optimization in reducing occupational risk
should not be the controlling issue for debate because "we have failed to achieve an optimal
solution from the standpoint of public health advocacy and economic efficiency and social
utility.' 58
48 Id.
49 See Solomon, supra note 4, at 59.
50 Marvin E. Taylor, Return to Work Following Back Surgery: A Review, 16 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 79, 79
(1989).
51 See Solomon, supra note 4, at 59.
52 Id. at 59-60.
53 Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 130-39.
54 Id. at 123.
55 Id. at 129-61.
56 Id. at 123.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 125-26. Besides describing the paradox concerning the failure of businesses to invest in pre-
vention of workplace injuries despite apparent economic advantages, Professor Spieler also addresses the
causes of this phenomenon. She provides four interrelated explanations including: (1) the workers' compen-
sation paradigm that assumes an inevitableness of workplace harms and relieves employers of fault; (2) the
workers' compensation insurance system that dilutes the deterrent effect of costs; (3) employers' tendency to
decrease claims costs independent of the injury rate; and (4) employer ignorance about the effectiveness of
prevention. Id. at 161-244.
While I draw similar conclusions about the etiology of the failure by employers to invest in programs
aimed at prevention and mitigation of workplace injuries and diseases, this Article's explanation is not lim-
ited in its focus on employers' beliefs and inaction. Rather, it provides a description based on perceptions
and attitudes of employees and health care providers as well. Moreover, this Article addresses this problem
in the context of the advent of managed care and capitation in workers' compensation. This Article proposes
that, given the inevitability of the imposition of managed care in this arena, this new regulatory effort should
not perpetuate or even expand the systemic flaw which permits the apparent lack of effect of rising workers'
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
B. THE ADVENT OF MANAGED CARE
Because nearly half of all workers' compensation costs have been attributed to medical
expenses, there has recently been a call for the implementation of managed care and capita-
tion in workers' compensation. 59 Some experts predict "that virtually all medical care for
workers' comp[ensation] claims will be provided through managed-care systems" by the
end of this decade. 60 As a practical matter, managed care will soon dominate health care
delivery in workers' compensation in nearly all states because of cost concerns. 61 Realisti-
cally, the current social debate focuses not on whether managed care will be imposed on
workers' compensation, but rather on what form it will take.
Based on present trends, it appears likely that states will impose managed care in a
way which emphasizes reductions in medical treatment. 62 In a sense, states are grafting
managed care from mainstream health care delivery onto the workers' compensation system
without accounting for the interrelationship between health care and employees' productiv-
ity.63 Instead, policymakers view health care delivery in workers' compensation as an in-
dependent concern apart from the legal/administrative structure. I discuss below how this
separatist approach arose from the beliefs of employers, health care providers, and employ-
ees.
IV. THE SEPARATION OF THE LEGAL/ADMINISTRATIVE
AND HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
The failure of the workers' compensation system to encourage an optimal level of
workplace safety results from a disjunction of the health care delivery system and the le-
gal/administrative system that assesses whether the costs of workplace accidents exceed the
costs of prevention. This systemic flaw results from various beliefs about workers' com-
pensation, held by employers, health care providers, and employees, which define health
care treatment in a manner that does not include reform of workplace practices. Thus, im-
plementation of managed care in workers' compensation appears currently to focus on
treatment costs, rather than on also looking at the potential impact of managed care on in-
demnity costs, including lost work time and other compensation based on the amount of
disability. 64 This narrow focus fails to consider other ways to reduce total workers' com-
pensation costs, such as preventing workplace accidents and developing return-to-work
programs. Moreover, if the emphasis of managed care remains solely on reductions in
treatment costs, then indemnity costs and total workers' compensation costs may potentially
remain unchanged or even increase because of increases in lost work time resulting from
inferior medical treatments.
compensation costs on incentives to reduce and mitigate injuries associated with workplaces. Instead, this
Article argues that managed care should be implemented in a manner that reduces total workplace costs,
rather than focusing only on treatment costs. Professor Spieler does not address the role of managed care in
workers' compensation.
59 Solomon, supra note 4, at 59-64.
60 Leavenworth, supra note 6, at 37 (citing a 1994 Louis Harris & Associates study that surveyed risk
managers).
61 See Doherty, supra note 6, at 36.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 For example, because fee schedules set a ceiling on reimbursements, they prevent health care provid-
ers from relying on treatments that may be more expensive and yet economically worthwhile because of
effectiveness in returning patients to their jobs. Similarly, within HMOs, preferred provider networks, and
capitated systems, conventional managed care emphasizes reductions in amount of treatment and referral to
specialists.
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A. THE SEPARATIST APPROACH WITHIN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
Employers tend to view workers' compensation as a welfare benefit system.65 If em-
ployers believed, instead, that workers' compensation primarily serves as a means of opti-
mally reducing the costs of workplace accidents and the costs of prevention, they would
integrate their business organizations in a manner that allows the health care delivery sys-
tem to inform the administrative system about ways to reduce total accident costs through
accident prevention and mitigation. However, because employers tend to view workers'
compensation as a welfare benefit system, the administrative system remains separate from
the health care delivery system, and the administrative system relies on regulatory compli-
ance with safety standards, rather than on workers' compensation claims experience or ad-
vice from health care providers. 66
I. The Welfare Benefit Paradigm
Employers tend to believe that the imposition of managed care on workers' compen-
sation is consistent with other welfare reform movements, such as cutbacks in Medicare and
Medicaid. 67 Within this legal vision, the workers' compensation system represents a social
welfare system that provides minimal support to keep injured employees from destitution.6 8
Legal historians sometimes view the workers' compensation system as representing a hu-
manitarian gesture to provide welfare assistance. 69 The welfare benefit paradigm justifies
managed care that focuses only on treatment and reduces the amount of treatment provided.
Such a reform bases its justification on the need to reduce costs in order to make the system
more economically sustainable.7 0
In Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Garcia, the defendants based their
justification for a legislative reduction of medical benefits in workers' compensation on this
analogy to welfare reform. 7 1 They argued that the legislature should be "free to use any
rational system for the delivery of benefits." 72 Thus, they asserted that reliance on a pure
impairment-rating system with a minimal threshold amount was constitutional.7 3 The appel-
late court rejected this argument and noted that "[a]ccording to this argument, any substitute
will do. . . . [T]he legislature could decree that a worker will be paid $100, or even one
dollar, for any injury sustained, no matter how severe." 74 Thus, the defendants in Garcia
65 By using the term welfare benefit, I refer to the ability of state legislatures to reduce the amount
provided to claimants by legislation or changes in regulation. In contrast, the term legal right refers to those
benefits granted to defined classes of people which cannot be reduced by simple legislation or regulation, but
which requires amendments to state or federal constitutions. Thus, I do not differentiate between benefits
based on need as compared to other entitlements. My use of this terminology instead turns on the degree to
which our society guarantees the workers' compensation benefit. This approach distinguishes between gra-
tuities which can be easily reduced and entitlements which require greater efforts to change.
66 See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
67 Medicare and Medicaid programs bear similarity to workers' compensation systems because they
function as social insurance programs subject to statutory or regulatory changes.
68 See Scarzafava & Herrera, supra note 34, at 944.
69 See, e.g., Gurtler, supra note 20, at 294 (characterizing workers' compensation as a social benefit);
Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 180-81 n.254 (comparing workers' compensation to other social
insurance programs).
70 Cf United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of
retirement act that reduced retirement and disability benefits based on the need to prevent threatened bank-
ruptcy of the retirement system).
71 862 S.W.2d 61, 86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 88.
74 Id. at 86. The Texas Supreme Court ultimately overruled the appellate court and held that, the re-
form legislation provided an adequate remedy to employees so as not to violate of the state constitution. 893
S.W.2d 504, 521-22 (Tex. 1995).
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relied on a legal argument consistent with the view that workers' compensation represents a
welfare benefit.
Because employers tend to treat workers' compensation as a welfare benefit, they as-
sume that the health care provided to injured employees represents part of a welfare sys-
tem.75 Thus, they emphasize financing medical care in a nominal way, such as reliance on
fee schedules that set a ceiling on payments to health care providers. 76 Under the welfare-
benefit paradigm, employers fulfill their obligation by providing financial assistance for
medical treatment. 77 This results in a system which separates the delivery of health care
from the departments within business organizations devoted to administering other aspects
of workers' compensation.
This separatist administrative system gives autonomy to health care providers, but also
limits their effectiveness. By assuming that employers fulfill their obligations by financing
health care, businesses typically do not attempt to ensure the quality of health care delivery
to their injured employees. 78 Furthermore, health care providers in the community do not
have informational input on business decisions concerning workplace safety. 79
2. The Effect of the Welfare-Benefit Paradigm
on the Structure of Business Organizations
Because separatist businesses view workers' compensation primarily as a welfare
benefit, they may administer it through the personnel department. Thus, a personnel office
collects workers' compensation information so it can make compensation decisions, rather
than improve workplace safety. A separatist business may also assign all responsibility for
workplace safety to an environmental health and safety office. The office primarily focuses
on compliance with government regulations rather than on gathering the information neces-
sary, including workers' compensation data, to determine the optimal approach to reduce
workplace accidents and to implement company-wide programs based on this information.8 0
This separatist organization does not encourage business administrators to use experience
from workers' compensation in imposing workplace measures aimed at prevention of
workplace accidents. Thus, the existence of separatist business organizations may explain
the paradoxical failure of rising workers' compensation costs to encourage additional in-
vestment by employers in prevention and mitigation of workplace injuries and diseases.
Why do separatist businesses not reorganize themselves internally in the face of rising
workers' compensation costs? While separatist businesses may initially treat workers'
compensation as a welfare benefit, they could integrate departments in response to these
rising costs. However, businesses retain their separatist organizations for at least two rea-
sons: (1) a focus on the short term; and (2) an underreporting of work-related injuries and
diseases.
75 See, e.g., Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 180-81 n.254.
76 Fee schedules set the upper limits of reimbursements, and thus fail to assure quality of care.
77 See Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 180-81 n.254.
78 Typically, a primary care or emergency room physician treats the injured employee after a work-
related accident. Thus, the vast majority of work-related injuries and diseases are treated within mainstream
medicine, but are not subject to managed care regulation. See Polakoff& O'Rourke, supra note 10, at 26.
79 Large businesses may hire in-house health care providers to treat employees, but usually injured
employees seek their own physicians within mainstream medicine. See id.
80 Nor are insurers likely to serve as coordinators of legal and medical issues under the current system.
Insurers have mainly acted as financial institutions that charge appropriate premiums and pay out or deny
claims. Outside of this function, insurers have largely limited their activities to implementing traditional
managed health care directives, such as utilization review of medical providers. Insurers have not generally
undertaken the role of inspecting workplaces or requiring programs to reduce accident costs through adop-
tion of appropriate return-to-work programs, for example.
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First, separatist business organizations may refuse to reorganize even in the face of
rising workers' compensation costs because they fail to take a long-term perspective. The
initial investment in developing the necessary integrated organizational structure and in
establishing programs aimed at prevention and return-to-work may not result in overall
savings in workers' compensation costs until several years later.8 1 Indeed, workers' com-
pensation claims may actually increase after initial implementation of programs aimed at
injury prevention and mitigation due to rising employees' awareness in identifying work-
related injuries.8 2 Thus, implementing these programs requires a long-term perspective.
However, middle management of American business tends to focus on the short
term.8 3 Management may focus on immediate investment returns because of dependence on
short-term financial measurements, such as annual profits. 84 Thus, separatist businesses
may not invest in injury prevention and mitigation programs because of their focus on
short-term profits.
Second, separatist businesses may take an alternative approach, in lieu of integration
even in the face of rising work-related injuries and diseases. The lack of available medical
expertise within the personnel departments of separatist business organizations may result
in the underreporting of work-related injuries and diseases. 85 Underreporting reduces the
economic incentive to devote resources to lowering the cost of workplace accidents. 86 An
employee or supervisor may not perceive an injury or disease as work-related. For exam-
ple, injuries from repetitive motion result not from a single work-related event but develop
insidiously over time. 87 Thus, businesses may not correctly determine the link between
workplace exposures and injuries.88 Furthermore, expensive workers' compensation premi-
ums constitute an incentive for the employer to underreport work-related injuries and ill-
nesses. 89 This underreporting avoids having to pay premiums for indemnity and health
care, and thus externalizes these costs. 90 Externalization of costs reduces the financial in-
centive to make the workplace safer. 91
81 See, e.g., Don G. Tonti, Healthletics Program, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRATEGIES FOR
LOWERING COSTS AND REDUCING WORKERS' SUFFERING 23, 31 (Edward M. Welch ed., 1989) [hereinafter
WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRATEGIES] (citing an example of instituting an early intervention program that
initially increased reports of injuries).
82 Id.
83 See ROBERT B. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 144 (1983); Robert H. Hayes & William J.
Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 68-69; James
R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 980-83 (1992).
84 See Dennis E. Logue, Shareholder Wealth and Management Compensation, CORP. ACCT., Winter
1984, at 38; Repetti, supra note 83, at 981; Andrew Tylecote, Time Horizons of Management Decisions:
Causes and Effects, 14 J. ECON. STUD. 51, 58-59 (1987).
85 Personnel departments usually obtain medical information either from outside consultants, commu-
nity providers, or environmental health and safety sources. Employees themselves may be reluctant to file
workers' compensation claims. See Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 217-18.
86 See id. at 127.
87 One approach for identifying high-hazard jobs-passive surveillance-relies on medical, insurance,
and safety records and may underestimate the true extent of cumulative trauma problems. W. Monroe Key-
serling, Occupational Ergonomics: Promoting Safety and Health Through Work Design, in OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH, supra note 21, at 161, 175.
88 See id.
89 One commentator contends that the workers' compensation system does not reduce the costs of acci-
dents because of this incentive to underreport claims rather than to make the workplace safer. See Spieler,
Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 217-37.
90 See id. at 231-33.
91 The failure to internalize these costs means that nonworkers' compensation insurers and employees
pay the medical costs. Employers do not bear the costs and thus do not experience the financial pressure to
reduce these costs.
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A separatist administrative system fails to reduce workplace accident costs by not in-
ternalizing these costs appropriately. 92 A rational employer would invest in workplace
safety if the costs of workplace accidents exceeded the costs of pfrvention.93 A disjunction
between health care delivery and the administrative component of workers' compensation
explains the failure of workers' compensation to reduce the costs of accidents. This sepa-
ration reduces administrative access to appropriate medical expertise and creates barriers
that prevent the optimal investment in accident prevention.
3. The Limitations of Implementing Managed Care Under the Welfare Benefit Paradigm
The optimal prevention of workplace injuries requires coordination among these de-
partments and among all supervisors for monitoring workplace safety at the grassroots
level. 94 Thus, successful accident prevention programs require a commitment from many
departments within a business organization and depend on cooperation among departments
otherwise insulated from each other. 95 In a separatist administrative system, however, this
cooperation does not occur. Instead, various departments and offices tend to operate on
independent budgets and thereby lack incentives to cooperate unless mandated to do so. To
design, implement, and monitor workplace safety at an optimal level, all these departments
should rely on and share data to reduce workplace accidents. Each supervisor must under-
stand the importance of workplace safety and implement effective return-to-work policies.
Managed care implemented under a separatist administrative system will emphasize
reductions in treatment costs, rather than involve strategies requiring an interaction between
the administrative and health care delivery systems. 96 A separatist administrative system
views managed care as akin to past reliance on fee schedules-that is, managed care be-
comes simply a means of lowering treatment costs. 97 Similarly, a separatist administrative
system will not adopt programs aimed at preventing workplace-related injuries and diseases
or return-to-work programs because such programs require close cooperation between ad-
ministrative systems and health care providers. 98
This welfare reform approach fails to appreciate that workers' compensation, unlike
general welfare programs, arose from the particular relationship between employers and
employees. 9 9 Employers bear social responsibility for injuries that arise in work-
92 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
93 See CALABRESI, supra note 37, at 95-96.
94 See Donald E. Galvin, Disability Management: An Overview of a Cost-Effective Human Investment
Strategy, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRATEGIES, supra note 81, at 39, 49.
95 See CYNTHIA ROBINSON, OFFICE OF POLICY RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF INS., LOWERING
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE COSTS BY REDUCING INJURIES AND ILLNESSES AT WORK 99-100
(1993) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA INSURANCE STUDY].
96 A separatist administrative system, by definition, views health care financing as independent from
indemnity payments. Such a system concentrates on reducing health care financing without taking into ac-
count that certain reductions in health care financing may increase indemnity payments because they reduce
the quality of health care that, in turn, increases lost work time. Similarly, a separatist administrative system
does not consider the alternative possibility that increasing health care financing may reduce total workers'
compensation costs if it results in improving the quality of health care in a manner that reduces lost work
time.
97 Fee schedules control costs by setting a ceiling on the payment for procedures or provider visits.
Thus, the quality of care rendered remains unregulated by fee schedules.
98 Injury-prevention and return-to-work programs require integration of the administrative and the
medical care systems. See infra part V.B.
99 Under workers' compensation, the employer bears financial responsibility for all injuries arising
from the workplace, without regard to the employer's or employee's negligence. See DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS
AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 870 (1993).
Thus, workers' compensation should ideally provide a financial incentive to employers to make the work-
place safer. In comparison, the public-at-large pays for general welfare programs. See Emily A. Spieler,
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places.100 This responsibility explains why employees do not have to make monetary con-
tributions to receive workers' compensation, in contrast to social welfare programs such as
social security.101 Workers' compensation resulted from this recognition of the social re-
sponsibility of employers to their injured employees.102 Thus, managed care programs
aimed merely at minimizing treatment costs may, at some point, compromise this social
responsibility.
The welfare benefit paradigm, furthermore, could justify any and all cutbacks in health
care. 103 It fails to provide guidance in developing a system that encourages efficiency and
quality of health care. 104 Instead, this paradigm perpetuates the separation of health care
delivery from the administration of health and safety programs. The welfare benefit para-
digm ignores the potential value found in the common interests shared by employers and
employees with respect to health care. A high quality system of health care that focuses on
treatment, prevention, and mitigation of injuries actually would provide benefits to both
groups.105
B. THE PERSPECTIVE OF EMPLOYEES
Employees tend to perceive the provision of health care through workers' compensa-
tion as a legal entitlement. 106 Such a perception fails to provide incentives to mitigate the
costs of health care. Furthermore, employees may oppose the imposition of any managed
care program based on this belief.
1. The Rights Paradigm
Employees perceive the financing of health care provided by the workers' compensa-
tion system as a legal right.107 While the general public has no guaranteed right to health
care, the workers' compensation system legally entitles employees who have sustained a
work-related injury to full coverage of medical costs. 108 The historical understanding on
which workers' compensation began concurs with this idea.109 Prior to the establishment of
workers' compensation systems, employees could sue their employers for workplace inju-
ries in tort law." 0 Under the workers' compensation reform, employees forfeited the right
to sue their employers in tort law in exchange for a guaranteed set of benefits, including
complete coverage of medical costs. II Because of this guaranteed right to coverage, insur-
ers do not currently expect injured employees to pay deductibles or copayments. 112 Thus,
Injured Workers, Workers' Compensation, and Work: New Perspectives on the Workers' Compensation De-
bate in West Virginia, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 333, 357 (1993) [hereinafter Spieler, Injured Workers].
100 Dobbs, supra note 99, at 870.
101 Under workers' compensation, employers bear the sole burden of paying medical bills. Unlike pri-
vate insurance programs for mainstream medicine, workers' compensation does not require employees to pay
deductibles. See Doherty, supra note 6, at 38.
102 See Spicier, Injured Workers, supra note 99, at 357 (workers' compensation is enmeshed with social
concerns including the social responsibility of employers).
103 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
104 Because the welfare benefit paradigm focuses on reductions in health care financing, this approach
ignores total costs including indemnity payments.
105 See infra part VI.
106 See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 6, at 36.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See Ellen R. Peirce & Terry M. Dworkin, Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease: A
Return to Original Intent, 67 OR. L. REV. 649, 652-55 (1988).
110 Id. at 651.
111 See Watson & Valen, supra note 20, at 501.
112 See Ballen, supra note 38, at 1293.
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employees at least initially will tend to see the imposition of managed care as employers
abandoning their agreement to provide health care coverage unfettered by cost controls."13
An example of a rights-based approach to reductions in workers' compensation bene-
fits can again be found in Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Garcia.14 In that
case, employees and unions challenged the constitutionality of Texas workers' compensa-
tion legislative reforms.' 15 The state appellate court held that the legislative reforms were
unconstitutional on a number of grounds.1 6 In particular, the appellate court found that a
fifteen percent impairment-rating threshold as a qualification for supplemental benefits
violated the state constitution's "open courts and due course provisions.""17 The court rea-
soned that pure reliance on an impairment-based system did "not adequately compensate
workers for the loss of their common law rights [to sue in tort law]" and thus was not ra-
tional."18 Thus, employees in Garcia premised their argument on the belief that workers'
compensation constituted a legal right that should not be compromised by reforms that re-
duced benefits. 119
2. The Resulting Lack of Incentives to Mitigate Health Care Costs
For employees, the interdependence of legal claims and health issues encourages the
overutilization of the health care delivery system. Because of the absence of deductibles or
copayments, employees have no direct incentives to act as prudent purchasers of health
care.1 20 Thus, employees do not have a financial incentive to choose the best managed
medical care program.' 2' Because primary care physicians may have little expertise in oc-
cupational medicine, employees may have difficulty identifying appropriate providers.
Furthermore, because the opinions of health care professionals may influence compensation
decisions, employees may engage in physician shopping, especially if a provider renders an
opinion that may adversely affect their legal claims. 22 Finally, employees may have a fi-
nancial incentive to choose health professionals who provide excessive medical services. 23
Injured employees may use the amount of medical care provided as evidence of the severity
of disability to justify benefit payments under the indemnity portion of workers' compensa-
tion. 124
113 See Doherty, supra note 6, at 38.
l14 862 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). At present, there are no published cases which directly ad-
dress whether managed care provisions in a workers' compensation system may violate the rights of employ-
ees.
115 893 S.W.2d 504, 516 (Tex. 1995).
116 862 S.W.2d at 81-88, 93-96 (finding that the act violated Texas constitutional provisions guarantee-
ing rights to open courts, due course of law, equal protection, and jury trials).
117 Id. at 86.
118 Id. at 87. In other words, the impairment-based system that required a 15% threshold was not an
"adequate or reasonable substitute" for common law negligence actions. Id. at 86.
119 The Texas Supreme Court, however, ultimately overruled the appellate court and found that the re-
form legislation provided an adequate remedy. 893 S.W.2d at 521.
120 See Ballen, supra note 38, at 1293.
121 Traditional managed care programs may not contain the kind of providers necessary to care for in-
jured employees. See Costigan & Robertson, supra note 15, at 60.
122 Thus, the health care provider not only treats the injury or disease, but also influences whether it
will be categorized as a workers' compensation case as well as the amount of compensation obtained. This
additional responsibility may encourage more doctor shopping as compared to that found within the regular
health care delivery system. See Ballen, supra note 38, at 1293.
123 Studies show that workers' compensation patients take longer to recover and require more treatment
than similar patients in the regular health care delivery system. See C.G. Greenough & R.D. Fraser, The
Effects of Compensation on Recovery from Low-Back Injury, 14 SPINE 947, 953 (1989); Tweed, supra note
18, at 56.
124 See Ballen, supra note 38, at 1293.
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3. The Limitations of Implementing Health Care Under the Rights Paradigm
If states administer health care under this rights paradigm, then ultimately the debate
must turn on what constitutes adequate health care. Employers surely are not responsible
for guaranteeing health care coverage for unnecessary or excessive medical treatments. 125
Yet, the adequacy of health care cannot be defined objectively. 126 The definition includes
many subjective factors, such as the quality of the physician/patient relationship and the
expected degree of therapeutic effectiveness. 127 The preservation of the patient's choice of
health care providers may serve as an important way of resolving this tension. 128
However, employees will face difficulty in defending the proposition that health care
received through workers' compensation should be totally unfettered by cost concerns,.es-
pecially given that regular health care delivery now depends on managed care systems.129
Historically, states have generally imposed cost controls on health care provided through
workers' compensation. 130 States have long relied on setting fee schedules to limit the
amounts of payments made for medical services. 131
The rights legal paradigm not only challenges managed care of treatment, but it also
undermines the imposition of injury-prevention and return-to-work programs. Under the
rights paradigm, employers may assert their own property right to prevent access to the
workplace by health care providers. 32 Employers may object to the intrusion by providers
into their workplaces and may reject advice suggesting improvements in work practices. 133
Both employers and employees might well object to return-to-work programs. Such pro-
grams represent an intrusion on workplaces owned and controlled by employers, and em-
ployees may resist the notion that the program should require them to return to work while
still suffering from their injuries. 134 Thus, this paradigm perpetuates the disjunction of
health care delivery from administration of health and safety in workers' compensation.
The rights paradigm threatens the application of managed care aimed at the prevention and
mitigation of workplace injuries.
The manner in which states implement managed care in workers' compensation in the
future depends on how the system characterizes the provision of health care. Employees
will likely characterize the provision of health care as a right and thus oppose the imposi-
tion of managed care. Alternatively, employers and insurers will likely characterize the
provision of health care as a welfare benefit and thus contend that cost saving necessitates
125 Thus, managed care programs have grown in number during the past several years to keep medical
costs reasonable. See id. at 1293-94.
126 See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1465-72 (1994). For an
outstanding discussion about limitations of the rights paradigm generally, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
127 See Elhauge, supra note 126, at 1465-72.
128 See id. at 1525-26 (noting the importance of allowing individuals to choose their care-allocating
plan).
129 Managed care has become the dominant force in mainstream health care delivery. See Peter Boland,
Market Overview and Delivery System Dynamics, in MAKING MANAGED HEALTHCARE WORK, supra note 15,'
at 3, 3.
130 The most common forms of cost controls have been fee schedules and utilization review. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
131 See id.
132 Health care providers do not have a comparable right to gain access to workplaces, although indi-
vidual employees may provide information to their providers concerning workplace safety.
133 Health care providers do not possess the same authority as, for example, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration inspectors.
134 Physicians should identify the optimal time to return to work prior to complete recovery. They
should not, however, recommend return to work if the patient cannot withstand the demands placed on him
or her by the restricted duty. See Harold R. Imbus, Clinical Aspects of Occupational Medicine, in OC-
CUPATIONAL MEDICINE 3, 10 (CarlZenz et al. eds., 3d ed. 1994).
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the implementation of managed care. Because of rising workers' compensation costs, legis-
latures and courts will likely side with employers and insurers and require implementation
of managed care. 135 Neither characterization, however, encourages optimal health care de-
livery. Indeed, both characterizations support a separatist approach to managed care. Be-
cause the imposition of managed care appears inevitable, participants should focus, instead,
on a community commitment to improving public health. Such a community commitment
would emphasize the importance of quality of care and would also encourage the reduction
and mitigation of workplace injuries. The current health care delivery system, however,
fails to provide a public health approach.
C. THE SEPARATIST APPROACH IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
Presently, the workers' compensation system encourages a separatist health care deliv-
ery system. Because the separatist administrative system gives health care providers dis-
cretion in their practices, the natural tendency of physicians has been to maintain their tra-
ditional practices inadequately tailored to caring for work-related diseases and injuries. The
average primary care physician possesses little training in either identifying work-related
illness or treating employees differently than other patients because medical schools gen-
erally provide meager training in occupational medicine. 36 Instead, most physicians take a
traditional patient-centered approach to treating occupationally related illness. This ap-
proach fails to emphasize prevention or mitigation of workplace illnesses.
I. The Patient-Centered Paradigm
In a separatist health care delivery system, medical treatment centers on the patient
and focuses on the treatment that may alter the patient's internal biology.137 Instead of
promoting injury prevention and mitigation, a health care provider renders treatment to in-
dividual patients with outcomes assessments based on reductions in mortality and morbidity
rates, often defined in terms of length of treatment or hospitalization. 138 Managed care in
this setting focuses on reducing treatment costs based on these outcomes assessments. 139
The patient-centered approach limits preventive medicine to procedures that affect the
employee's physiology, such as immunization and mammography.140 While managed care
in the regular health care system often sells itself to the public by emphasizing the incentive
it provides to health care providers to keep their patients healthy, 141 a patient-centered pre-
135 See, e.g., Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995)
(sustaining validity of workers' compensation reform against constitutional challenge by employees and
unions).
136 See Lee S. Newman, Occupational Illness, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1128, 1128 (1995).
137 Traditional medicine disciplines focus on the internal biology of patients. Primary care disciplines
include internal medicine, family medicine, and pediatrics. Internists focus on the internal biology of adults,
while pediatricians specialize in treatment based on the internal biology of children. Family medicine prac-
titioners take a broader view of the dynamics of families, but still focus on internal medicine and pediatrics.
The discipline of occupational and environmental health represents a relatively new approach to medicine,
by focusing on environmental determinants of disease.
138 Mainstream managed care programs thus focus on reductions in mortality and morbidity rates as
criteria for quality of care. See Kathleen Jennison, Organizational Dynamics of Quality Control, in MAKING
MANAGED HEALTHCARE WORK, supra note 15, at 421, 427.
139 See Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Reform: Promise and Limitations, 20
AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 42-43 (1994).
140 Traditional medicine focuses on what can be done in the physician's office. Alternatively, occupa-
tional medicine physicians treat the workplace to prevent and ameliorate injury and disease.
141 See, e.g., Ronald R. Loeppke, Prevention and Managed Care: The Next Generation, 37 J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENV'T. MED. 558, 560, 562 (1995) (promoting a managed care program which emphasizes
prevention based on a patient-centered approach).
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ventive medicine approach becomes less useful when confronted with workplace injuries.
The more effective approach relies on altering workplace practices and exposures causing
the injuries, rather than limiting medical intervention to alteration of patient physiology. 142
2. The Resulting Failure to Mitigate and Prevent Workplace Injuries and Diseases
At present, the health care delivery system also fosters its separation from the adminis-
trative system governing the workplace. Many treating physicians lack the expertise to
identify and treat appropriately injuries and diseases caused in the workplace. Medical
schools and residency programs fail to provide adequate training in occupational medicine
principles. 143 Historically, physicians have had a financial incentive not to identify work-
related illness in order to receive payments larger than are available through workers' com-
pensation fee schedules. 4 4 By not identifying an illness as work-related, physicians may
also avoid the administrative inconveniences of filing appropriate paperwork. Furthermore,
physicians may want to avoid involvement in the workers' compensation legal system. Fi-
nally, because health care providers receive payments based on the amount of treatment,
workers' compensation actually provides incentives to overtreat and fails to encourage the
prevention and mitigation of workplace injuries and diseases.' 4 5 Primary care physicians,
who lack occupational medicine training, may be reluctant to return a patient to work
against that patient's wishes, even if the patient is physically capable of returning to work.
While a patient may sue a physician for malpractice for returning him or her to work prema-
turely, the workers' compensation system does not provide a similar deterrent for failure to
return a patient to work on a timely basis.
3. The Limitations of Implementing Managed Care Under the Patient-Centered Paradigm
The patient-centered approach to treatment does not result in an optimum reduction of
the costs of workplace accidents. The costs associated with an injured employee include
not only treatment costs, but also indemnity costs associated with time away from the
job.146 Thus, insurers should not make quality assessments based on length of treatment
and hospitalization of injured employees, but should instead also concentrate on measuring
the loss in work time. Treatments which have greater effectiveness in returning injured
employees to their jobs more quickly might be economically justifiable even if they cost
more. 147 Furthermore, managed care under this patient-centered approach ignores the use-
fulness of return-to-work programs in mitigating the costs of workplace accidents.'4 8
Modification of work which allows an injured employee to return sooner than otherwise
142 See infra part V.
143 See Joseph LaDou, The Practice of Occupational Medicine, in OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 1, 1
(Joseph LaDou ed., 1990).
144 Professor Spieler noted that:
doctors in particular have a profound influence on the cost of both medical treatment and
workers' benefits. As a result, physicians are painted (sometimes accurately) as profession-
als who tend to overtreat, overcharge, and offer opinions which are influenced more by the
source of the payment than by the actual condition of the patient.
Spieler, supra note 2, at 241.
145 Fee schedules may encourage overutilization if they simply fix the amount paid per visit or proce-
dure. Thus, if fee schedules fix the fees per visit or services and ensure comprehensive service, health care
providers seeking to maximize income may increase-the quality of services provided. See WILLIAM G.
JOHNSON ET AL., THE ZENITH PROJECT: REPORT No. 1, THE EXCESS COSTS OF HEALTH CARE FOR WORK-
RELATED INJURIES 7 (1995).
146 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
147 See Ballen, supra note 38, at 1293.
148 See Newman, supra note 136, at 1133.
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may be more effective than simply relying on a treatment's effectiveness in altering the
physiology of the patient.149 The workers' compensation system thus encourages a segre-
gation between business administration and medical providers that fails to encourage al-
teration of workplace practices and exposures based on the experience of health care pro-
viders.
V. TOWARD A PUBLIC HEALTH PARADIGM
Unfortunately, the current public debate focuses almost exclusively on choosing be-
tween the rights and the welfare benefit paradigms, 150 although neither choice leads to the
goal of an optimal reduction in the overall costs of accidents in workplaces. Both para-
digms justify the disjunction of health care delivery from the administration of health and
safety programs in workplaces. The debate ought to shift to consideration of a different
paradigm I propose here. My paradigm emphasizes a community commitment to public
health.
Public health emphasizes the promotion and preservation of health in communities. 151
Preventive medicine, which includes the subspecialty of occupational medicine, encourages
public health promotion in addition to treatment and cure. 5 2 Unlike a typical clinical medi-
cal practice that emphasizes the healing of an individual patient's sickness, a public health
practice brings to bear all community resources-including law-in an attempt to prevent
and treat a public health problem.' 53
The public health perspective emphasizes rehabilitation and prevention of injuries and
diseases through measures that change social conditions. Such a paradigm recognizes the
importance of cost containment, but does not lose sight of human concerns. 154 Under the
public health focus on workplace safety, employers, employees, health care providers, in-
surers, and the government shoulder the responsibility to integrate their efforts in practical
ways to reduce the social and economic costs of accidents. Thus, encouraging accident
prevention and injury mitigation could become just as important as monitoring treatment.
Workplace safety becomes a community commitment, rather than a matter of choosing be-
tween the interests of either the employer or the employee. If state governments adopted
this paradigm, they might encourage occupational medicine principles that emphasize both
quality and efficiency in treatment.
Implementing occupational medicine principles through managed care systems would
be consistent with the public health paradigm. Occupational medicine physicians train to
identify work-related diseases and injuries by taking an occupational history and applying
149 Physicians, in making return-to-work evaluations, allow patients to return to those work duties
which will not adversely affect their health. See Robert J. McCunney, Occupational Medical Services, in A
PRACTICAL APPROACH, supra note 24, at 3, 8.
150 See supra part IV.A-B.
151 See John M. Last, Scope and Methods of Prevention, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
3, 3 (John M. Last et al. eds., 12th ed. 1986). Prevention consists of three components: (1) primary preven-
tion prevents the occurrence of disease or injury; (2) secondary prevention provides for early detection and
intervention, ideally before the pathology becomes evident; and (3) tertiary prevention minimizes the effect
of disease and disability. Id. For the purposes of this Article, the term prevention refers to primary and
secondary prevention. Return-to-work programs represent an example of tertiary prevention.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 4.
154 In Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Garcia, the texas Supreme Court noted that the
original Texas workers' compensation act, like other workers' compensation statutes, "was part of a nation-
wide compensation movement, [and] was perceived to be in the best interests of both employers and employ-
ees." 893 S.W.2d 504, 511 (Tex. 1995).
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the principles and knowledge of epidemiology, toxicology, and public health.155 Occupa-
tional medicine also involves the study and application of ergonomics, a discipline that ex-
amines the effects of physical and emotional stress on workplace performance.156 Some
ergonomics programs have been shown to improve both health and workplace productivity
by preventing back and repetitive trauma injuries. 157 Additional prevention-oriented activi-
ties in occupational medicine include preplacement physical examination, drug testing, and
compliance with health and safety regulations. 158 Finally, occupational medicine physicians
routinely walk through workplaces to familiarize themselves with job functions and to
identify hazardous exposures.159
Although modem medicine has incorporated occupational medicine principles, practic-
ing physicians have not yet systematically used them in their clinical practice.' 60 In a na-
tion with relatively few board-certified specialists in occupational medicine, most patients
are treated by primary care physicians who have little or no training in occupational medi-
cine principles. 16 1 The advent of managed care in workers' compensation provides a sig-
nificant opportunity to implement these principles widely. Occupational medicine physi-
cians should participate in developing and implementing managed care programs. They can
educate and supervise other providers, encourage the utilization of programs aimed at pre-
vention and mitigation of injuries, discourage overutilization of provider services, and im-
prove the quality of care.
A. DISCOURAGING OVERUTILIZATION OF TREATMENT AND
PROMOTING THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE QUALITY OF CARE
A system of managed care that relies on occupational medicine principles would dis-
courage overutilization and improve the quality of health care. Such an approach would
also discourage overutilization by encouraging both efficient and high quality treatment. If
managed care only emphasizes the minimization of treatment costs, indemnity costs asso-
ciated with longer absences from work due to inferior medical treatment may counterbal-
ance these savings.162 If we wish to optimize both efficiency and public health concerns,
then we need to emphasize equally treatment costs and quality. Workers' compensation
should favor quality health care that returns employees to productive employment sooner at
a reasonable cost over an approach that merely emphasizes the minimization of treatment
costs. A growing medical literature describes treatment approaches that focus on efficacy
in returning patients to the workplace. 63 For example, occupational medicine currently
emphasizes encouraging patients with lower back strains to return to work as soon as medi-
cally reasonable because early return to work improves medical prognosis and prevents
155 For a summary of the clinical approach to occupational medicine, see Imbus, supra note 134, at 3-
12.
156 See 0. Bruce Dickerson & Walter E. Baker, Practical Ergonomics and Work with Video Display
Terminals, in OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE, supra note 134, at 428, 428-29.
157 See infra part VI.A.
158 See McCunney, supra note 149, at 3-16.
159 See Benjamin H. Hoffman & Douglas C. Gray, The Establishment of an Occupational Health Pro-
gram, in A PRACTICAL APPROACH, supra note 24, at 48, 48-49.
160 See McCunney, supra note 149, at 3; Newman, supra note 136, at 1128 (few physicians are "trained
to recognize or prevent occupationally induced illness").
161 See McCunney, supra note 149, at 3.
162 The total costs of workplace accidents include accident costs and the costs of their prevention. Ac-
cident costs include lost work time and medical treatment costs.
163 See, e.g., Ann S. Kasdan & Nancy P. McElwain, Return-to-Work Programs Following Occupational
Hand Injuries, 4 OCCUPATIONAL MED. STATE OF ART REv. 539, 539 (1989); L. Alicia Ryden et al., Benefits
of a Back Care and Light Duty Health Promotion Program in a Hospital Setting, 13 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH
222, 222 (1988); Taylor, supra note 50, at 79.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
physical deconditioning associated with isolation from regular activity.' 64 The alignment of
economic efficiency and quality of care suggests that health care providers use this occupa-
tional medicine knowledge to return patients to work when medically reasonable.
Regulators of health care within the workers' compensation system therefore should
encourage health care providers to rely on occupational medicine principles. States should
set fee schedules at levels commensurate with those set in the regular health care delivery
system to encourage quality care. If the state sets fee schedules too low, only a small num-
ber of providers will be willing to participate, and they will provide health care on a high-
volume, but low-quality, basis.
Regulators may encourage both efficiency and quality of care in a variety of managed
care systems. Occupational medicine physicians should assist regulators in establishing
treatment guidelines that encourage both efficiency and quality of care. Utilization review
should allow for provider discretion to pursue aggressive diagnosis and treatment protocols
if providers can prove their approaches successfully promote both efficiency and improve-
ment of health outcomes. Regulators should require that HMOs and provider groups incor-
porate oversight that utilizes occupational medicine expertise, especially in identifying
work-related injuries and illnesses.
States should not judge capitation programs in the workers' compensation system by
the same criteria used in capitation systems within the regular health care delivery system.
If early referrals to physical therapy or certain specialists result in more optimal outcomes
in returning employees to their jobs, a capitation program should not discourage these prac-
tices. States should assess capitation programs based on their effectiveness in reducing total
accident costs-including their ability to return employees to their jobs when it is medically
reasonable.
Because of the dearth of empirical information about effectiveness of managed care
programs in workers' compensation, state government regulators should establish data col-
lection systems to track the effectiveness of various managed care systems and medical
treatment approaches. This data would also provide a better basis to determine the reason-
ableness of payments to providers through group health plans and capitation systems. 65
States should offer employers and employees choices among various managed care alterna-
tives in order to encourage competition. The success of workers' compensation reforms
may depend on allowing competition among alternative health care plans because of the
variety of business activities and sizes, the various arrangements that providers may have
with businesses, and the lack of empirical data indicating the likely success of any particu-
lar alternative in all situations.
B. ENCOURAGING PROGRAMS AIMED AT PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF INJURIES
As previously noted, the discipline of occupational medicine represents an integration
of medical, administrative, and legal knowledge concerning workplace injuries and dis-
eases. This multi-disciplinary expertise facilitates provision of a number of different serv-
ices to various departments within a single business organization. Occupational medicine
physicians routinely interact with employees, employers, industrial hygienists, safety spe-
cialists, benefit administrators, supervisors, attorneys, insurers, and others to prevent, treat,
164 See Ryden et al., supra note 163, at 224.
165 See Costigan & Robertson, supra note 15, at 62. In Massachusetts, the Department of Industrial
Accidents has initiated a program to collect data in a comprehensive manner from insurers. The Medical
Utilization Tracking and Trending System will evaluate the effectiveness of providers and organizations in
treating injured employees.
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and mitigate workplace injuries.166 The role of an in-house occupational medicine physi-
cian may also include tracking the recovery of employees treated by physicians practicing
in the community. 167 Occupational medicine physicians collaborate with (1) administrators
and personnel managers to establish return-to-work programs;168 (2) environmental health
and safety officers to establish practices and programs to prevent future injuries;169 and (3)
risk managers to determine-the etiology of work-related injuries and to assist in evaluating
prognoses, impairments, and disabilities of injured employees. 70 Thus, the appropriately
trained occupational medicine physician has unique qualifications to facilitate effective in-
tegration of various efforts to improve workplace health and safety.
As one important example of mitigation of injuries, restricted duty positions are de-
signed to allow employees to engage in return-to-work activities that will not interfere with
recovery.' 7' Restricted duty assignments may actually benefit a recovering employee be-
cause they tend to prevent physical deconditioning associated with isolation from regular
activity. 72 For instance, prolonged work absence due to back injury is associated with poor
prognosis. 73 A restricted duty job, however allows an injured employee to develop and
maintain the physical strength to return to regular duty, and it may serve as'a useful gauge
of recovery. 74 State regulators may encourage return-to-work and accident-prevention
programs by restructuring fee schedules and by offering a reduction in workers' compensa-
tion premiums to employers who establish them.' 75 Managed care programs should imple-
ment these programs, and utilization review agents should be able to describe program fea-
tures to patients and providers.
The consolidation of workers' compensation and regular health care delivery within
HMOs and pre-paid group practices would remove, or at least diminish, the incentive to
cost-shift by failing to identify work-related injuries.' 76 This approach would internalize
the costs of workplace accidents and encourage employers to invest more in workplace
safety. The success of this approach depends, however, on the ability of HMOs and pre-
paid group practices to implement occupational medicine principles within their organiza-
tions. These health care systems could accomplish this goal by having occupational medi-
cine physicians develop protocols and supervise primary care providers.
Capitation programs in workers' compensation may not be more effective than reli-
ance on treatment guidelines and utilization review. In workers' compensation, providers
already have a strong financial incentive to rely on efficient treatments because of contrac-
tual ties to employers. Employers may simply direct their injured employees to providers
who offer more effective managed care. Moreover, capitation may create greater patient
166 See Frank H. Leone, Working with the Business Community, in A PRACTICAL APPROACH, supra note
24, at 106, 108.
167 See Robert Galvin, Health Care Management, in A PRACTICAL APPROACH, supra note 24, at 581,
594.
168 See Jeffrey S. Harris, Economics of Occupational Medicine, in A PRACTICAL APPROACH, supra note
24, at 491, 496.
169 See Hoffman & Gray, supra note 159, at 50-52.
170 See id. at 54-56.
171 See Robert J. McCunney & Reid'T. Boswell, Musculoskeletal Disorders, in A PRACTICAL AP-
PROACH, supra note 24, at 166, 170.
172 See id.
173 See Greenough & Fraser, supra note 123, at 954.
174 See McCunney & Boswell, supra note 171, at 170.
175 Small businesses may have difficulty establishing restricted duty positions because of less flexible
employment arrangements. Perhaps the establishment of cooperative arrangements among small businesses
or providing community service resiricted duty jobs may be helpful.
176 If workers' compensation provides more generous reimbursement, cost-shifting may occur in the
opposite direction. Cost-shifting may be occurring in both directions, depending on the particular payment
mechanisms employed.
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distrust of physicians in workers' compensation compared to regular health care systems
because of the explicit nature of the direct payments by employers through their insurers.
The treatment decisions of physicians in workers' compensation not only affect the amount
of treatment provided, but also impact the indemnity payments made to patients.
Capitated programs may prove more effective, however, if managed care not only dis-
courages overutilization, but also encourages prevention and mitigation of the effects of
workplace injuries. If regulatory systems encourage physician access to workplaces to es-
tablish injury prevention and return-to-work programs, then capitation may provide signifi-
cant incentives to providers to reduce the costs of workplace accidents through these
means.1 77 If capitation focuses only on minimizing treatment, the costs of accidents in the
workplace may actually increase because of larger indemnity payments associated with in-
creased absenteeism when treatments are less effective.178
Managed care programs, including capitation, should encourage prevention and miti-
gation of the effects of workplace injuries to optimize the reduction in the costs of accidents
in the workplace. Such an approach would also make managed care more acceptable to
employees, and it relies on a community commitment to public health. Thus, the implemen-
tation of managed care could serve as an opportunity to advance occupational medicine
principles in workers' compensation.
VI. ADVANCING SHARED INTERESTS IN PUBLIC HEALTH
Employers, employees, and health care providers share objectives consistent with the
public health imperatives of improving treatment quality and implementing return-to-work
and injury-prevention programs. Thus, implementing these public health programs pro-
vides a potential means for achieving the community goal of reducing the costs of workers'
compensation.
A. EMPLOYERS' INTERESTS
Employers should be concerned about the overall costs of workers' compensation-
including indemnity costs associated with lost work time-rather than focusing solely on
reducing treatment costs. Employers pay workers' compensation premiums that reflect not
just treatments costs, but also indemnity costs. Thus, employers should favor high quality
medical treatment which results in returning employees to work sooner over cheaper, less-
effective medical treatment. A managed care program at the Johns Hopkins Institute dem-
onstrated that it could reduce total workers' compensation costs by delivering high quality
treatment.1 79 This program included reduced wait periods for treatment, increased diagnos-
tic testing to improve reliability, and close coordination between the occupational medicine
physician and other specialists. 80 Such high quality treatment has reduced total workers'
compensations by more than thirty percent.' 8'
Employers should also place greater emphasis on preventing injuries and diseases be-
cause of economic savings and improved employee productivity. Professor Spieler states
177 1 recognize that this is an optimistic view. It would be necessary to encourage long-term relation-
ships between providers and employers in these situations. The positive results might not become manifest
until several years after injury-prevention programs begin. Indeed, as noted earlier, the initiation of these
programs may trigger an increase in workers' compensation claims in the short term because physicians
would educate injured employees about the relationship between their injuries and work.
178 For a description of various capitation pilot projects, see Leavenworth, supra note 6, at 38-41.
179 See Dan Wise, How Providing More Care Costs Less, Bus. & HEALTH, Apr. 1994, at 67, 67.
180 See id. at 67-68.
181 Id. at 67.
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that "[e]vidence does indicate ... that if employers take prevention seriously, the cost sav-
ings can be substantial."182 She cites empirical evidence estimating that "[e]mployers can
minimize the rate and severity of injuries by as much as forty percent."' 8 3 Finally, injury-
prevention programs not only create economic savings by reducing injuries, but also im-
prove employee morale and thus also increase productivity.184 Indeed, employers imple-
ment injury-prevention programs most often for productivity reasons, rather than for safety
concerns.
185
Employers also benefit from return-to-work programs because of decreased disability
payments. Researchers have demonstrated the effectiveness of such programs, especially
with respect to back injuries.' 8 6 About two percent of the U.S. industrial work force suffers
compensable back injury every year,187 and these injuries account for ninety percent of total
compensation costs.1 88 Return-to-work programs allow injured employees to return to work
when it is medically reasonable. They result in decreased disability payments 8 9 and de-
creased risk of permanent disability. 90 For example, implementation of a return-to-work
program at a community hospital reportedly saved $900 per back injury and reduced lost
work time by four weeks.'91 Similarly, employers can obtain a substantial economic sav-
ings for other occupational injuries.192 Thus, managed care programs should encourage
employers to make reasonable accommodations for temporarily impaired employees
through establishment of return-to-work programs.193
B. EMPLOYEES' INTERESTS
The imposition of managed care on workers' compensation appears inevitable. A
1994 survey of risk managers predicted that within five years virtually all medical treatment
rendered under workers' compensation will be provided through managed care systems. An
emphasis by managed care programs on high quality treatments, rather than reduction in
182 Spieler, Perpetuating Risk?, supra note 2, at 154.
183 Id. at 159 (citing CALIFORNIA INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at iii). The medical literature also
provides numerous examples of the cost-effectiveness of accident-prevention programs. See id. at 154-55;
see, e.g., Sharon Coleman & Sandra Hansen, Reducing Work-Related Back Injuries, NURSING MGMT., Nov.
1994, at 58, 61.
184 CALIFORNIA INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at iii-iv.
185 See id. at 88.
186 See, e.g., Greenough & Fraser, supra note 123, at 954; Ryden et al., supra note 163, at 223; Taylor,
supra note 50, at 86. Researchers have also demonstrated the effectiveness of return-to-work programs for
other injuries. See, e.g., R. Cole Goodman, An Aggressive Return-to-Work Program in Surgical Treatment of
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome: A Comparison of Costs, 89 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 715, 716
(1992); Kasdan & McElwain, supra note 163, at 540.
187 See Taylor, supra note 50, at 79.
188 See Ryden et al., supra note 163, at 223.
189 See id. at 224.
190 See Greenough & Fraser, supra note 123, at 954.
191 See Ryden et al., supra note 163, at 224.
192 See Goodman, supra note 186, at 715 (aggressive return-to-work program for carpal tunnel syn-
drome reduced costs by 58%); Kasdan & McElwain, supra note 163, at 543 (return-to-work programs for
hand injuries reduce workers' compensation costs and employee replacement costs).
193 Such encouragement would not be extraordinary, given the requirements under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), which require employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employ-
ees. It prohibits employment discrimination against the disabled and applies to employers with 15 or more
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). The ADA defines disability as (1) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more life activities, (2) a record of such an impairment, or (3) being regarded
as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1995). Under the ADA, the employer must make
reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals who can perform the essential function of a job with or
without reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). Similarly, in return-to-work programs, an
employer identifies available jobs which can be performed by temporarily disabled employees.
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treatment costs alone, should benefit employees. High quality treatments should reduce
morbidity and the extent of disability. For example, the managed care program at the Johns
Hopkins Institute has managed not only to retain patients despite their freedom to see pro-
viders outside the network, 94 but to attract injured employees from outside providers.' 95
Thus, the right of patients to choose freely among provider networks does not necessarily
interfere with the imposition of managed care programs if such programs provide quality
treatment.1 96 Preservation of patient choice of providers allows for quality assurance and a
necessary degree of patient autonomy. 97
Employees also benefit from injury prevention programs. Employees generally suffer
a substantial economic loss from work-related injuries and diseases. Public and private
support programs only replace about forty percent of wages lost by employees who are se-
verely disabled by occupational disease and about sixty percent of wages by those suffering
from occupational injury.' 98 Moreover, any pain and suffering associated with a work-
related injury or disease is not compensated under workers' compensation. 199 Thus, an em-
phasis on injury prevention benefits employees economically. Obviously, such an approach
also benefits employees by avoiding the impairment and pain associated with workplace
injuries. In fact, labor groups eventually altered their initial opposition to the adoption of
workers' compensation statutes because they believed that the statutes would provide an
economic incentive to prevent workplace accidents. 200
Finally, employees also benefit from return-to-work programs if administered in a ra-
tional and humane manner. On-the-job rehabilitation following occupational injury should
play an important role in a employee's recovery. 20 1 As a general matter, the longer em-
ployees are away from their jobs, the more difficult it is for them to return to the work
force. 202 Return-to-work programs should be tailored to the individual patient, allowing
only those activities which can be safely performed.
Thus, both employers and employees may benefit mutually from managed care pro-
grams that emphasize high quality care, injury-prevention, and return-to-work programs.
C. THE PROFESSIONAL ETHIC OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
The practice of medicine in the age of managed care represents a challenge to the very
identity of the medical profession. The danger exists that patients may perceive physicians
as brokers for competing financial interests, damaging their professional integrity.203 In the
case of workers' compensation, the most serious danger to the medical profession may arise
in situations where patients feel that their physicians minimize treatments based not on pro-
194 See Wise, supra note 179, at 67.
195 See id. at 70.
196 See Leavenworth, supra note 6, at 38; Managed Care: High Quality Medical Providers Can En-
courage Savings, Use of Programs, 6 Workers' Compensation Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 529, 529-30 (Oct. 30,
1995).
197 See Cerne, supra note 8, at 52 (president of managed care firm in California states that whether pa-
tients stay is a function of quality of care, rather than if there is mandatory lock-in with one provider); El-
hauge, supra note 126, at 1538-41.
198 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR INTERIM REPORT, supra note 28, at 462.
199 See Boden, supra note 21, at 204.
200 Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace,
in ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 20, at 454.
201 See Kasdan & McElwain, supra note 163, at 539.
202 Greenough & Fraser, supra note 123, at 954; Kasdan & McElwain, supra note 163, at 539.
203 See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obliga-
tions in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 254 (1995); see generally David Orentli-
cher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 141 (1995) (writing
about discontinuities of physician-patient relationship and division of fiduciary duty).
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fessional standards, but on what an insurer or employer will pay. 204 Patients' perceptions
that capitated systems financially reward their physicians for minimizing treatments and
impairment assessments at the expense of potential indemnity awards to patients exacerbate
this situation.
The challenge to physicians lies in shaping managed care programs in ways that pre-
serve their professional integrity. The practice of occupational medicine may provide use-
ful lessons about how physicians may cope with conflicts of interest created by managed
care systems. Occupational medicine physicians cope with intense issues of conflicts of
interest, 205 have developed pragmatic approaches to preserve the physician/patient relation-
ship, and yet remain faithful to the calling of this public health profession.206
The occupational medicine physician must serve at least two masters. He or she owes
legal and ethical duties to both the employee-patient 207 and the employer. 208 Moreover, the
financial incentive to satisfy the employer's wishes further complicates the dual duties. The
physician in this specialty accommodates these conflicts in several pragmatic ways. Com-
munication with patients and adherence to confidentiality whenever feasible preserve the
traditional core of the physician-patient relationship. The physician should inform the pa-
tient that medical information may be released to the employer if it is a workers' compen-
sation case. The physician maintains confidentiality of information the employer does not
204 See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Ethical Issues in Managed
Care, 273 JAMA 330, 331 (1995).
205 See Kathleen M. Rest, Ethics in Occupational and Environmental Health, in OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH, supra note 21, at 241, 252.
206 See id. at 241-53.
207 The code of ethical conduct for occupational medicine physicians requires that they "accord the
highest priority to the health and safety of individuals in both the workplace and the environment." See
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE, CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT, re-
printed in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, supra note 21, at 252 [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE CODE OF
ETHICAL CONDUCT]. Even if paid by the employer, an occupational medicine physician may have a legal
duty under tort law to provide quality care to patients. The vulnerability of occupational medicine physi-
cians to malpractice actions under tort law depends on their contractual relationship with their employer.
See Lawrence P. Postol, Suing the Doctor: Lawsuits by Injured Workers Against the Occupational Physician,
31 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 891, 891 (1989). The contractual relationship does not protect from liability
physicians who serve as independent consultants or who work in independent clinics. See Barbara P. Bil-
lauer, The Legal Liability of the Occupational Health Professional, 27 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 185, 186
(1985). This duty includes the responsibility of proper diagnosis, treatment, and return-to-work decision-
making. The failure to satisfy this duty may result in medical malpractice. See, e.g., Williams v. Katz, 23
F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 1994). To satisfy the duty to diagnose properly, a physician must recognize the work-
relatedness of an injury or illness. Indeed, this determination, if not properly made, could detrimentally
affect the health of the patient. If a physician failed to diagnose occupational asthma, for example, the phy-
sician's inaction may fatally harm the patient on return to the workplace exposure. The standard of care for
treatment would require the physician to provide care consistent with that provided by other occupational
medicine specialists. See Billauer, supra, at 186. A physician also has a duty not to return a patient to work
until medically reasonable. See, e.g., Ewing v. St. Louis-Clayton Ortho Group, Inc., 790 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.
1986).
208 There are three typical contractual arrangements between occupational medicine physicians and
employers. First, the physician may serve as a medical director or staff'physician within the medical de-
partment of a company. Second, the physician may work as a consultant to handle various occupational
health issues as they arise. Third, the physician may work in an independent clinic and provide medical
services to the employees of businesses. The businesses may contract directly with the clinic. In all three
situations, the physician has a strong financial incentive to share common objectives with employers. If
physicians serve as medical directors of a company, they may have the most stable financial relationship and
a longer time horizon to achieve desired goals. Physicians who serve as consultants or who work in inde-
pendent clinics have less stable financial relationships with employers. For example, the contracts of these
physicians might be renewable on an annual basis or even subject to termination at will. Thus, consultants
and physicians in independent clinics may have the strongest financial incentives to satisfy the objectives
shared with employers within a shorter time horizon.
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need to resolve personnel issues. 209 For example, a physician should not divulge unneces-
sary information such as diagnosis or specific medical information. Instead, the physician
may indicate what physical impairments the employee has in order for the employer to de-
cide if it can make reasonable accommodations for continued employment. Furthermore,
the physician remains obligated to communicate relevant medical information to the patient
even if the medical finding only incidentally relates to the objective of the testing. While an
employer may obligate the physician to fulfill tasks which the employer orders, the physi-
cian should inform the patient about findings relevant to his or her health. 210 Moreover, the
ethical physician informs the patient of the physician's business relationship with the em-
ployer.211 Communication and adherence to confidentiality remain essential to maintaining
the core physician/patient relationship. 212
Ideally, the occupational medicine physician bases treatment on both quality of care
and efficiency. Such treatments not merely represent an ethical ideal, but also may be eco-
nomically justifiable. 213 The employer must pay not only for medical treatments, but also
for a broader benefit package which includes indemnity for lost wages. Thus, effective but
more expensive treatments which accelerate recovery and return to work save indemnity
costs, including lost wages.214 Furthermore, when occupational medicine physicians track
the treatment by other providers, they should avoid overutilization and ensure that the em-
ployee gets quality care.
The focus in occupational medicine on an objective shared by employers, employees,
and the community at large-improving the health and safety of workplaces-has reduced
the potential conflict associated with the dual duties outlined above. The commitment to
certain public values constitutes a defining feature of professionalism. The occupational
medicine focus means that the physician not only commits to assisting others in their pur-
suit of self-interests, but also carries a social obligation to pursue certain public health ob-
jectives.215 The code of ethical conduct for occupational medicine physicians includes ac-
cording the "highest priority to the health and safety of individuals in ... the workplace." 216
Indeed, employers, employees, and physicians share this interest, which represents a larger
public health interest as well. This profession's belief about high quality occupational
medicine furthers the interest of the community at large. Occupational medicine grew out
of an older discipline of industrial medicine, which focused almost exclusively on the
treatment of work-related injuries. 217 Patients perceived company doctors who practiced
industrial medicine as biased toward protecting the employers' interests. 218 The modem
discipline of occupational medicine recognizes the importance of treating work-related in-
juries, and emphasizes the prevention of injuries and the mitigation of the effects of injuries
on workplace activities. Focusing on this broader interest avoids forcing the physician to
choose between potentially conflicting interests of employers and employees.
209 See McElveen & Beck, supra note 28, at 30-31.
210 See OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT, supra note 207, at 252.
211 See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 204, at 335.
212 These approaches are consistent with those recently recommended for all physicians by the Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association. See id. at 334-35.
213 See supra part VI.A.
214 See Ballen, supra note 38, at 1293.
215 Analogously, attorneys not only act in the interests of their clients, but are also officers of the court
who are committed to certain public ideals.
216 OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT, supra note 207, at 252.
217 See ROBERT J. MCCUNNEY, HANDBOOK OF OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 4 (1988).
218 For a fascinating study of how corporate physicians cope with their modern day conflicts of interest,
see DIANA C. WALSH, CORPORATE PHYSICIANS: BETWEEN MEDICINE AND MANAGEMENT (1987).
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The potential conflict of interest faced by the occupational medicine physician will
inevitably lead to some extremely difficult situations in which either the employer (or its
insurer) or the employee fundamentally questions what the physician has done. In these
circumstances, it is helpful to provide some safety valves in the form of second medical
opinions or the selection of another provider. Employers and their insurers in some states
may rely on IME evaluations by physicians of their choice as a check on the health care
provider. Indeed, treating physicians may recommend to an insurer that an IME evaluation
should be ordered, particularly if they feel that such an evaluation might support an evalua-
tion that may be at odds with a patient's beliefs. Some state systems may allow patients to
seek a second medical opinion or to continue treatment with a different physician if they
become unsatisfied about their relationship with the initial treating physician. 219 Especially
if patients no longer trust their physician, these alternatives help to alleviate tensions or dis-
putes. However, that the vast majority of workers' compensation patients stay with their
initial treating physicians demonstrates an overall patient satisfaction, despite the existence
of potential conflicts of interest. 220
Physicians should seek a common ground among competing interests and strive to
maintain the physician/patient trust. It remains important that physicians' public values, not
what side they take, shape the professional identity of health care providers within workers'
compensation. Physicians should shape managed care systems to match public health ide-
als, rather than to allow these systems to shape their identity as professionals.
VII. CONCLUSION
The advent of managed care in workers' compensation brings us to a crossroads in
workers' compensation health care policy. We could, perhaps more easily, implement
managed care under the conventional approach that perpetuates the schism between the
administration and health care systems. Thus, if the administrators of managed care em-
phasize reductions in treatment costs, experiences similar to Mrs. Lopez's will recur. Such
a separatist approach, in fact, encourages physicians to remain uninvolved with the safety of
workplaces because it fails to give financial incentives for this activity. A separatist ap-
proach also exacerbates the adversarial tension between employers and employees because
it decreases the medical care available for workplace injuries and diseases. Moreover, a
conventional managed care approach coerces the physician to side with the employer in
offering less medical treatment. Although Mrs. Lopez received full satisfaction of her right
to medical care, this approach failed to encourage high quality care, prevention, or return to
work.
We do not have to go in this direction, although conventional wisdom suggests it. I
believe that managed care, by incorporating a public health perspective, can benefit em-
ployers, employees, and physicians, and can only be achieved if all these participants agree
to assume new responsibilities. Mrs. Lopez's employer should have taken responsibility for
hiring health care providers to establish and administer injury-prevention and return-to-
work programs. In turn, Mrs. Lopez should understand that she has the responsibility, as
well as the right, to return to work as soon as it becomes medically reasonable. Health care
providers would have to realize that patients must be treated in the context of the work en-
vironment and that the workplace itself requires scrutiny. This integrationist approach thus
219 State laws allowing employees to choose their own providers have not significantly hampered the
implementation of managed care. See Solomon, supra note 4, at 62. Managed care programs that provide
high quality care not only retain patients referred by employers, see Leavenworth, supra note 6, at 38, but
actually attract employees from outside the system. See Wise, supra note 179, at 70.
220 See Leavenworth, supra note 6, at 38; Resnick, supra note 5, at 38; Solomon, supra note 4, at 62.
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requires more complex cooperation compared to the conventional managed care approach,
but opens the gateway to greater possibility.

